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(FOMC) in conducting monetary policy and on
the undesirable outcomes of these procedures. The
litany of faults included the following examples
and prescriptions for changes in procedure.
• Fed monetary policy is based on a nominal
short-term interest rate, which is an unre-
liable guide. The Fed interprets a low rate
as indicating monetary ease, a high rate as
indicating monetary tightening. A low rate,
however, may in fact be consistent with
contraction if the growth rate of the quantity
of money has been declining, and a high
rate may be consistent with expansion if
the growth rate of the quantity of money has
been rising. Moreover, monetary authorities
who rely on an interest rate instrument are
prone to delay a needed increase to combat
inflation because they believe that it will
produce a rise in the unemployment rate.
Action is often late and excessive.
Prescription: Monetary policy should be
based on a credible, pre-announced, long-
run stable growth rate of a monetary aggre-
gate, preferably the monetary base or M2.
• The Fed instructs the Manager of open
market operations at the Federal Reserve
Bank of New York to maintain money
market conditions that it specifies in its
directive to him, with a proviso that credit
does not unduly expand. The directive
leaves open to the Manager the interpreta-
tion to be placed on money market condi-
tions and therefore makes it impossible to
hold him accountable for the open market
operations that he chooses to execute.
Prescription: The Fed should not conduct
M
onetarists 40 years ago had a
double objective. They sought to
persuade the economics profession
that (i) monetary policy, not fiscal
policy, was the key to economic stability and (ii)
the control of inflation required limiting money
balances, not incomes policies and wage controls.
Monetarists also sought to persuade the Federal
Reserve to alter the way it conducted monetary
policy to conform to monetarist doctrines. In
the three years (1979-82) under Volcker, disin-
flationary monetary policy, announced as being
designed to contain growth in money aggregates,
brought down the U.S. inflation rate from 10
percent to 4 percent. Since then the inflation rate
has remarkably declined even more. A victory for
monetarism? During the Volcker era monetarists
did not think so. 
Missing from the retrospective on the Volcker
era at the special conference held at the Federal
Reserve Bank of St. Louis was a consideration of
the complaints against the Federal Reserve
expressed by monetarists. The conference papers
celebrated Volcker’s achievement and deemed the
changes in monetary theory and practice since
his time as virtually unqualifiedly successful.
I propose to review past monetarist strictures
(Shadow Open Market Committee, 1974-1982) and
ask whether current Federal Reserve practice pro-
vides a satisfactory response to them. Twenty-five
years after the Volcker era, has the contest between
the U.S. central bank and its critics been resolved?  
THE MONETARIST CRITIQUE
BEFORE THE VOLCKER ERA
The critique centered on alleged faulty pro-
cedures by the Federal Open Market Committee
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ditions, which have no precise definition,
as their rationale.
• The horizon of the Fed is the short interval
between FOMC meetings. The short horizon
is inconsistent with forward-looking fore-
casting. Policy is directed to transitory
events that it cannot influence. Prescription:
The Fed horizon should extend beyond
several quarters ahead. It should aim at a
long-run target, and that target should be
the rate of monetary growth that is expected
to produce price stability.
• The Fed engages in fine-tuning, attempting
to promote economic growth and employ-
ment by lowering interest rates until infla-
tion looms, whereupon it reacts by raising
interest rates and slowing economic growth
and employment. The policy creates a go-
stop economy. Prescription: The Fed should
abjure fine-tuning. It destabilizes the econ-
omy. Properly designed monetary policy
can achieve price stability, not real econ-
omic activity.  
• The Fed asserts that its exercise of discre-
tion in moving the short-term nominal
interest rate enables it to offset short-term
fluctuations in real economic activity.
Monetarists, however, argue that discretion
is destabilizing. Prescription: Fed policy
should embody the view that monetary
policy stabilizes real economic activity
when it is based on a rule that requires low,
stable money growth.
THE MONETARIST CRITIQUE
DURING THE VOLCKER ERA
I begin with a brief review of the disinflation-
ary monetary policy that Volcker presided over.
I then note monetarist criticisms.
In 1975, Congress passed Joint Congressional
Resolution 133 requiring the Fed to adopt one-
year money growth targets.  In October 1979, the
Fed described the reason for the new procedures
that Chairman Volcker introduced as more precise
control of monetary growth. The Fed announced
the target growth rate each year on a base equal
to the actual level of the money stock in the fourth
quarter of the preceding year. In the late 1970s,
the above-target money growth in one year was
built into the next year’s target. In 1981, the below-
target money growth was built into the 1982 target.
The resulting base drift contributed to instability
of money growth.
In advance of the new procedures, in the
early 1970s, the Fed began direct targeting of the
federal funds rate within a narrow band specified
by the FOMC each time it met. If the Fed was slow
in raising the target and, when it did raise the
target, did not raise it enough, as total nominal
spending rose, rapid money growth resulted and,
accordingly, higher inflation growth.
The new procedures, adopted on October 6,
1979, replaced direct federal funds rate targeting
with nonborrowed-reserves targeting. The new
procedure was intended to supply banks with the
average level of total reserves (the combination
of discount window borrowing and open-market
provision of nonborrowed reserves) that would
produce the rate of monetary growth the FOMC
desired over the period from a month before a
meeting to some future month, without regard
for the accompanying possible movement of the
federal funds rate outside a widened range of
400 basis points.
At the October 5, 1982, meeting, the FOMC
abandoned nonborrowed-reserves targeting. It
concluded that short-run control of monetary
aggregates was inferior to interest rate control.
The Fed’s difficulty with nonborrowed-reserves
targeting was attributed to the unreliability of the
demand function for discount window borrowing
on which its operating procedure depended. 
Observers who were not monetarists described
the Fed’s new procedure as a subterfuge. It per-
mitted the Fed to raise the federal funds rate to
unprecedented heights while alleging that it was
not itself acting on the rate. It was containment of
the M1 aggregate (as then defined) that produced
the interest rate result.
For monetarists, the Fed’s new procedure was
a travesty of their prescription of a pre-announced
steady and predictable rate of growth of a mone-
tary aggregate. The Fed missed its monetary
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growth fluctuated over a wide range. The volatil-
ity of quarter-to-quarter rates of monetary growth
during the three-year period was three times as
high as earlier (Friedman, 1984). Two recessions
punctuated the three-year period: January 1980–
July 1980 (produced by Carter administration
credit controls); and July 1981–November 1982
(produced by the new Volcker procedures). 
The Fed at bottom probably remained uncon-
vinced that it was desirable to base monetary
policy on control of a monetary aggregate. That is
why in 1968 it shifted from contemporaneous to
lagged reserve requirements despite the fact that
lagged reserve requirements impaired control of
the quantity of money. That was simply not a Fed
priority. 
Nevertheless, as noted, the inflation rate sub-
sided under the new procedure.
THE AFTERMATH
Twenty-five years have elapsed since the
Volcker era. How have the monetarists fared on
the two fronts on which they promoted views that
neither the academic community nor the Fed
initially accepted?
The monetarist debate with the economics
profession is in abeyance, but monetarist tenets
are now incorporated in mainstream economics.
Indeed, the profession now embraces the beliefs
that money matters, that inflation can be controlled
by monetary policy, that there is no long-run
trade-off between inflation and unemployment,
that there is a distinction between nominal and
real interest rates, and that policy rules help
anchor stable monetary policy.   
The monetarist battle with the Fed was also
not fought in vain. Whatever the shortcomings
of the Volcker procedure, it marked the onset of
central bank acknowledgment that their key
responsibility was to control inflation. By 2004,
central banks in all advanced countries have
adopted implicit or explicit targets for future infla-
tion. Their success in meeting their inflation
targets has gained them credibility. The target
has become the public’s expected inflation rate.
Growth rates of monetary aggregates tend to be
moderate and stable. Although central banks, with
the exception of the European Central Bank, ignore
money aggregates in their theoretical frameworks
and their practice, a possibly unintended result
of their success in controlling inflation is that
money aggregates currently have no predictive
power with respect to prices. Before the Volcker
era, money aggregates swelled as economic activ-
ity expanded and grew less as economic activity
faltered, forecasting higher and then lower
prices. This pattern is no longer observable.
What does this development teach us about
monetarism’s past disagreements with the Fed?
Monetarism lost the battle for a monetary aggre-
gate to replace the federal funds rate as the Fed’s
target, but it won the real goal that it sought,
namely, long-run stable growth of an aggregate
with no predictive power for prices.
Will this happy outcome endure? Time will
tell.
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